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ARIZONA CHRISTIAN SCHOOL TUITION ORGANIZATION V.

WINN: RECONSIDERING FLAST's EXCEPTION TO THE RULE
AGAINST TAXPAYER STANDING AND ESTABLISHING THE
TAX CREDIT DISTINCTION
INTRODUCTION

The United States Supreme Court's decision in Flast v. Cohen' has
been a source of controversy in American jurisprudence. Over several
decades, courts and commentators have wrestled with the meaning,
scope, and historical underpinnings of the Flast exception to the general
rule against taxpayer standing in Establishment Clause cases. 3
The Court recently reconsidered Flast's exception in Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn. 4 The Winn Court held that a
taxpayer lacks Article III standing under Flast to challenge a tax credit
but not a government expenditure.' The Court had never before relied on
this tax credit distinction to dismiss a claim for lack of standing. 6
Part I of this Comment reviews the origins of the general bar against
taxpayer standing and the Flast exception under the Establishment
Clause, and their respective treatment in several Supreme Court cases
leading up to Winn. Part II summarizes the facts, procedural history, and
opinions of Winn. Part III analyzes Winn's holding and the potential
problems posed by Flast's exception, namely its unduly vague meaning
and misguided reliance on James Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (Memorial and Remonstrance).
Part III further analyzes the merits of Winn's tax credit distinction, including its derivation from Flast, avoidance of speculative decisions, and
preservation of judicial economy. In addition, the section compares the
tax credit distinction under the Establishment Clause to the subsidy exception under the dormant Commerce Clause. Part IV concludes that the
tax credit distinction in Winn has merit, particularly in today's litigious
climate.

1. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
2.
See, e.g., Kyle Duncan, MisunderstandingFreedomfrom Religion: Two Cents on Madison's Three Pence, 9 NEV. L.J. 32, 32 (2008).
3.
See, e.g., Craig A. Stem, Another Sign from Hein: Does the GeneralizedGrievance Fail a
Constitutionalor a Prudential Test of FederalStanding to Sue?, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1169,
1207-08 (2008).
4.
Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn (Winn), 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011).
5. See id at 1447.
6.
Id. at 1452 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
7.
2 JAMES MADISON, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in THE
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 183 (Gaillard Hunt ed. 1901).
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I. BACKGROUND

A. The Origins ofStanding Doctrine and the Exception to the Rule
Against Taxpayer Standing
Derived from the text of Article III, standing doctrine gives federal
courts authority to hear only "Cases" and "Controversies." 8 General
claims of ideological or symbolic harm do not create standing because
they do not present a specific injury for which a court can provide redress.9 To have standing before a court, a plaintiff must demonstrate a
specific, personal injury caused by another. 0 If the Judiciary were not
limited to hearing only cases and controversies, courts might encroach
upon subject matters properly reserved for the Legislative and Executive
Branches." Standing doctrine enforces the constitutional separation of
powers by distinguishing judicial authority from legislative and executive power.12 It also ensures that the case before a court is suitable for
adjudication.13 Plaintiffs seeking redress under the Establishment
Clause1 4 based only on their taxpayer status generally must do so through
the political process and not through the courts.'
The Court pronounced the rule against taxpayer standing in the seminal case of Frothingham v. Mellon,'6 decided with Massachusetts v.
Mellon.17 In Flast,the Court created an exception to the rule against taxpayer standing under the Establishment Clause if a claimant can establish
a personal stake in the outcome. 1 Since Flast, the Court has grappled
with the precise meaning and scope of this exception.
B. Frothingham v. Mellon
In Frothingham,a federal taxpayer alleged that the effect of appropriations for the Maternity Act of 1921 would "increase the burden of
future taxation and thereby take her property without due process of
law." 9 In a unanimous decision, the Court dismissed the case for the
plaintiff's lack of standing because the case presented a matter of public,
not individual, concern. 20 The Court stated that in order to present a
8. U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 2, cl. 1.
9. See Duncan, supra note 2, at 34.
10.
Heather Elliott, Congress's Inability to Solve Standing Problems, 91 B.U. L. REv. 159,
168 (2011).
11.
Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1442.
12. Mark C. Rahdert, Forks Taken and Roads Not Taken Standing to Challenge Faith-Based
Spending, 32 CARDOZO L. REv. 1009, 1056 (2011).
13.
Id at 1059.
14.
U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .....
15.
Duncan, supra note 2, at 34.
16.
262 U.S. 447 (1923).
17. Id. at 488-89.
18. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968).
19. Id. at 479, 486.
20. Id. at 480, 487.

2011]

ARIZONA CHRISTIAN SCHOOL TUITION ORG.

307

"judicial controversy," a claimant must show that he or she sustained a
"direct injury" and did not "merely . .. suffer[] in some indefinite way in
common with people generally." 2 1 The Court suggested that a finding of

taxpayer standing would have made subsequent legislative spending decisions subject to excessive judicial review, possibly undermining the
separation of powers.2 2
C. Flast v. Cohen
Forty-five years later, in Flast, federal taxpayers sought to enjoin
government funding of parochial school instructional materials. 2 3 Carving out an exception to the general standing bar, the Court held that the
claimants had standing because the government "extracted and spent"
"tax money" in violation of the Constitution's establishment protec-24
tions.
The Court ruled that standing rests on whether a taxpayer has the
requisite "personal stake in the outcome of the controversy." 2 5 Taxpayers
could demonstrate standing when (1) their suit challenged congressional
taxing and spending authority, as opposed to regulatory expenditures,
26
and (2) their claim alleged a specific constitutional infringement. In
interpreting the scope of the Establishment Clause, Chief Justice Warren
relied on James Madison's pivotal Memorial and Remonstrance, in
which the then-Virginia legislator and eventual First Amendment
draftsman asserted that a state tax levy to support Christian teachers
would infringe upon people's religious liberties.2 7
In his dissent, Justice Harlan criticized the "personal stake" requirement as a mere restatement of the standing problem. 2 8 He also noted
that the criteria of the two-part nexus test did not meaningfully measure
the claimant's interest in the outcome of a suit. 29 Furthermore, Justice
Harlan questioned the Court's reliance on "isolated dicta" from Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance as authority in interpreting the Establishment Clause. 30

21.
Id. at 488-89.
22. See id. at 487 ("If one taxpayer may champion and litigate such a cause, then every other
taxpayer may do the same. . .
23. Id. at 85-86.
24. See id. at 105-06.
25. Id. at 101 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)) (internal quotation mark
omitted).
26. Id. at 102.
27. Id. at 103-04. For a discussion of Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance, see infra Part
Ill.A.2.
28. Id. at 121 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 126.
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D. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church & State, Inc.31
In Valley Forge, a nonprofit organization of taxpayers and several
of its employees challenged a government decision to transfer a tract of
federally-owned land to an evangelical Christian college. 32 Distinguishing Flast,the Court held that the claimants lacked standing to challenge a
federal executive's donative transfer of property to a religious organization.3 3 Justice Rehnquist found that the claimants failed Flast's first
prong because they challenged a decision by the Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare under the Property Clause of the Constitution,
not a congressional act under the Taxing and Spending Clause as required by Flast.34
In his dissent, Justice Brennan suggested that the distinction between the Property Clause and the Taxing and Spending Clause issues
was artificial because government donations of real property and funds
are functionally equivalent methods of providing financial support.35
E. Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. 36
In Hein, the Court examined a challenge to the President's creation
of the White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives and
similar departments in federal agencies supporting faith-based community groups' efforts to secure federal funding for nonreligious activities. 37
An organization opposed to the government endorsement of religion and
several of its members brought an Establishment Clause claim against
the agencies' uses of federal money to fund conferences promoting the
President's faith-based initiative.38 Declining to extend Flast beyond
congressional appropriation challenges, a three-Justice plurality held that
taxpayer status did not allow the claimants to challenge executive expenditures.39
Justice Alito's plurality opinion, which Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Kennedy joined, noted that, "in the four decades since its creation, the Flast exception has largely been confined to its facts."4 0 The
plurality further emphasized that Flast provided only a narrow exception,
any extension of which would expand judicial power and "raise serious
separation-of-powers concerns" between the Judicial and Executive

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

454 U.S. 464 (1982).
Id. at 469.
Id. at 489 n.25, 490.
Id. at 480.
Id. at 511-12 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
551 U.S. 587 (2007) (plurality opinion).
Id. at 593-94.
Id. at 595.
Id. at 593.
Id. at 609.
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Branches. 4 1 In a concurrence joined by Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia
concluded that Flast should be overruled because its conceptualization of
injury in purely mental terms is "wholly irreconcilable" with Article III
and particularized injury requirements embodied in standing doctrine.4 2
In a dissent that Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined, Justice Souter expressed concern that government "favoritism for religion
'sends the ...

message to ...

nonadherents that they are outsiders, not

full members of the political community."' 4 3 According to the dissent,
such a psychic or economic injury to religious nonbelievers "is serious
and concrete enough to be 'judicially cognizable" 4 4 and, thus, "sufficient
for standing."45
The split between the Court's conservative and liberal blocs in Hein
foreshadowed how the current Justices would align in Winn.
II. ARIZONA CHRISTIAN SCHOOL TUITION ORGANIZATION V. WINN
A. Facts
In 1997, the Arizona legislature passed a law granting state income
tax credits to Arizona taxpayers who donate to school tuition organizations (STOs).46 STOs are nonprofit organizations that award private
school scholarships to children. 4 7 Under the Arizona tax code, state taxpayers receive dollar-for-dollar tax credits of up to $500 per person and
48
$1,000 per married couple for contributions made to STOs.
STOs, in turn, use these charitable contributions to provide tuition
grants or scholarships to students attending qualified private schools,
which, in many cases, are religious. 49 A qualified school is a private
school in Arizona that "does not discriminate on the basis of race, color,
handicap, familial status or national origin . . . .',,o The Arizona statute
does not "preclude[] STOs from funding scholarships to schools that
provide religious instruction" or that give religious-based admissions
preferences. 5 1 Under the statute in effect at the time of this suit, however,

Id. at 611.
41.
Id. at 618-20 (Scalia, J., concurring).
42.
Id. at 643 (Souter, J., dissenting) (alterations in original) (quoting McCreary Cnty. v. Am.
43.
Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
44. Id. (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984)).

45.

Id.

46. See 1997 Ariz. Sess. Laws 548, 549-50 (codified as amended at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §
43-1089 (Supp. 2011)).
47. Id at 550.
48.
§ 43-1089(A).
Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1440 (2011).
49.
50.
§ 43-1089(H)(2)(a).
51.
Winn v. Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. (Winn II), 562 F.3d 1002, 1005 (9th Cir. 2009),
rev'd, 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011).
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STOs could not limit their scholarships for use at only one designated
school.52
B. ProceduralHistory
In an earlier lawsuit after the statute was passed but before it took
effect,53 Arizona taxpayers challenged the statute in state court under the
religion and anti-gift clauses of the Arizona Constitution and under the
Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution.5 4 Ultimately, the
Arizona Supreme Court held that the statute was not unconstitutional on
its face because the tax credit provided a neutral mechanism for encouraging investment in education.
After the statute took effect, different plaintiffs, including Kathleen
Winn, filed suit in federal court asserting that the statute violated the
Establishment Clause as applied.5 Because many STOs restrict the
availability of scholarships to religious schools, the claimants alleged
that the tax credit program deprived parents of a genuine choice between
scholarships to private secular schools and religious ones." The United
States District Court for the District of Arizona dismissed the suit as "jurisdictionally barred by the Tax Injunction Act."58 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal, and the
United States Supreme Court affirmed that decision. 59
On remand, Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization and
other parties intervened as defendants.60 The district court again dismissed the suit, this time for the taxpayers' failure to state a claim.61 A
three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit reversed, holding that the claimants had standing under Flast.6 2
On the merits, the appellate court ruled that the taxpayers had stated a
claim that the statute violated the Establishment Clause.63 The full court

52. Id. at 1006.
53.
Id
54. See Kotterman v. Killian, 972 P.2d 606, 610 (Ariz. 1999) (3-2 decision).
55.
Id. at 625.
56. See Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1441 (2011).
57.
Winn II, 562 F.3d at 1005. Although approximately twenty-five of the fifty-five STOs in
Arizona limit scholarship grants to religious schools, at least eighty-five percent of the state-financed
scholarship money is available only to students whose parents are willing to send them to religious
schools. Winn v. Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. (Winn III), 586 F.3d 649, 650, 660 n.6 (9th Cir.
2009), rev'd, 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011).
58.
Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1441; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006) ("The district courts shall not
enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a
plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State.").
59.
Hibbs v. Winn (Winn IV), 542 U.S. 88, 112 (2004).
60.
Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1441.
61.
Id
62. See Winn II, 562 F.3d at 1008, 1011.
63. See id. at 1023.
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denied en banc review, with eight judges dissenting." The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari.
C. Majority Opinion
Justice Kennedy delivered the Court's opinion, which Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito joined. 6 Because the
Arizona taxpayers challenged a tax credit and not a government expenditure, the Court held the taxpayers lacked Article III standing under
Flast.6 7 In reaching its decision, the Court presented the various constitutional and common law principles of taxpayer standing in Establishment
Clause cases.
First, Justice Kennedy recounted the Constitution's "tripartite allocation of power" and Article III limitations placed on the Judiciary.6 ' The
Court explained that a plaintiff seeking to invoke judicial power under
Article III must allege more than a "generalized interest of all citizens." 69
Justice Kennedy indicated that the case-or-controversy requirement of
Article III restricts judicial power to disputes presenting a specific injury
in need of redress. 7 0 The Court further cautioned that, if courts were not
otherwise restricted, the Judiciary might encroach upon matters properly
71
reserved for the Legislature.
Second, the Court noted that a case or controversy requires standing, which has certain minimum constitutional requirements under Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 72 including (1) an "injury in fact" that is "concrete" and "actual"; (2) a "causal connection" that is "fairly . . .
trace[able]"; and (3) the "'likely,' as opposed to merely speculative . . .
redress[ability]" of the injury.73 The Winn Court found that the claimants' alleged injury would require the Court to speculate about the potential impact of the STO tax credit on future tax bills. 7 4 Thus, Lujan's
three-part test provided no basis for standing.7"

64.
Winn IHI, 586 F.3d 649, 650, 658 (9th Cir. 2009), rev'd, 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011).
Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1441.
65.
Id. at 1439.
66.
See id. at 1447.
67.
Id. at 1441-42 (quoting Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of
68.
Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 47 (1982)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
Id. (quoting Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 217 (1974))
69.
(internal quotation mark omitted).
70. See id. at 1441.
71.
Id. at 1442.
72. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
73.
Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1442 (first and second alterations in original) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S.
at 560-61). Under Lujan, a plaintiff does not have standing merely as a citizen to claim that government action violates the Constitution or federal law because an Article Ill case or controversy requires a showing of "some direct injury" and not merely "a generally available grievance about
government." Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-74.
Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1444.
74.
See id.
75.
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Third, the Court cited the rule against taxpayer standing, which provides that taxpayer status is generally insufficient to establish standing in
Establishment Clause cases in order to limit potential judicial encroachment on the Legislative Branch.76 Because the purported injury from the
tax credit was "speculative" and not particular, the Court found that the
Arizona taxpayers did not have standing to assert their claim based on
the general rule.77
Fourth, the Court evaluated the claimants' possible standing under
Flast's nexus test. 78 The Court noted that the Flast exception is applicable to a religious entity's receipt of government expenditures drawn or
extracted from general tax revenues. 7 9 The Court acknowledged that governmental expenditures and STO tax credits might have similar economic consequences but found that the contribution of tax credit savings
to a taxpayer-designated, sectarian organization does not invoke Flast.so
Fifth, the majority reviewed similar tax benefit cases in which the
Court had reached a decision on the merits." The majority found that the
Court's decision to rule on the merits of other tax benefit cases did not
support standing in Winn because those cases did not reference standing
and thus do not stand for the proposition that no jurisdictional defect
existed.82 The majority cautioned that courts would risk mistake if they
assumed or relied on unstated rules of law from prior cases.83
D. ConcurringOpinion
In a concurring opinion joined by Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia
criticized the Court's holding in Flast as an anomaly in American jurisprudence. 84 As he did in Hein, Justice Scalia noted that he would repudiate Flastbecause its conceptualization of injury in purely mental terms
is "irreconcilable" with Article III and particularized injury requirements
embodied in standing doctrine.8 5 Justice Scalia indicated that he nevertheless joined the majority opinion because the Court held that Arizona

76. See id at 1442.
77. See id at 1444-45.
78. Id. at 1445.
79. Id. at 1448.
80.
Id. at 1447.
81.
Id at 1448 (citing Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983); Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970)).
82. Id
83. Id at 1448-49; see also Harper v. Va. Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 119 (1993)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that stare decisis is limited to "questions actually considered and
passed on, [which] ensures that this Court does not decide important questions by accident or inadvertence").
Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1449-50 (Scalia, J., concurring).
84.
85.
See id. at 1450; see also Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 61820 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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taxpayers lacked standing to sue "by applying Flast rather than distinguishing it away on unprincipled grounds."
E. Dissenting Opinion
In a dissenting opinion that Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor joined, Justice Kagan concluded that the Arizona taxpayers had
proper standing for their Establishment Clause claim." Justice Kagan
agreed with the majority that the general prohibition on taxpayer standing did not provide the claimants with a basis for having their day in
888
According to Justice Kagan, however, the Flast exception did.8
court.8
Justice Kagan suggested that a "simple" application of Flast's two-part
test demonstrated the claimants had standing.90 Under Flast'sfirst prong,
Justice Kagan maintained that the claimants' attack against an Arizona
tax code provision served as the requisite challenge to congressional taxing and spending power. 9' Justice Kagan further insisted that the Arizona
taxpayers satisfied Flast's second prong by invoking the Establishment
Clause, a specific constitutional limitation on taxing and spending authority. 9 2 In Justice Kagan's view, the claimants had established their
personal stake in the outcome of their constitutional challenge by satisfying both prongs of Flast'snexus test.93
The dissent then criticized the majority for its novel distinction between tax credits and government expenditures in deciding if the claimants had standing. 94 Justice Kagan noted that, in the nearly forty-four
years since Flast, no prior court had made this tax credit distinction for
purposes of standing.9 5 In the dissent's view, this distinction had never
been made because it is one without a meaningful difference.96 In response to the majority's warning against presuming jurisdiction when it
passes sub silentio, 97 the dissent dismissed the warning as false because
"[t]his and every federal court" considers standing even when not raised
by the litigants.98 Justice Kagan further insisted that the Court not "disregard the implications of an exercise of judicial authority assumed to be
Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1450 (Scalia, J., concurring).
86.
87. Id. at 1450, 1452 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
88. See id at 1451.
89. Id.
Id. at 1451-52.
90.
See id. at 1451.
91.
Id.
92.
Id. at 1452.
93.
94. Id
Id.
95.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1448-49 (majority opinion).
98. See id. at 1454 (Kagan, J., dissenting). Justice Kagan also pointed out that the Court had
adjudicated five similar tax benefit cases without questioning the plaintiffs' standing, including in a
prior iteration of this same case. Id. at 1452-53; see also Winn IV, 542 U.S. 88, 111-12 (2004) ("In a
procession of cases not rationally distinguishable from this one, no Justice or member of the bar of
this Court ever raised a § 1341 objection that... should have caused us to order dismissal of the
action for want ofjurisdiction." (citing Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983))).
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proper for over 40 years."99 Lastly, the dissent lamented the purported
implications of the Court's decision, stating that it "devastates taxpayer
standing in Establishment Clause cases."' 00 Justice Kagan suggested that,
"[h]owever blatantly the government may violate the Establishment
Clause, taxpayers [can no longer] gain access to the federal courts" because the tax credit distinction allows government to "insulate its financing of religious activity from legal challenge."'o'
III. ANALYSIS
The United States Supreme Court has long accepted the notion that
the Establishment Clause limits government favoritism for religion.102
However, the Court has also espoused the proposition that taxpayers
generally lack standing to challenge congressional appropriations.' 03 The
Court sought to reconcile these competing principles in Flast,which has
arguably become the most controversial taxpayer suit in American jurisprudence. '1 Winn highlights the potential shortcomings posed by
Flast's exception and establishes the tax credit distinction in taxpayer
standing suits under the Establishment Clause.
A. PotentialProblems Posed by Flast
Two potential problems presented by Flast's exception to the rule
against taxpayer standing include (1) its unduly vague meaning and
(2) its exclusive reliance on James Madison's Memorial and RemonstranceAgainst Religious Assessments.
1. The Flast Exception Is Unduly Vague
First, the Flast exception lacks precision. To relax the general
standing bar, the Flast Court required plaintiffs to establish a nexus between their federal taxpayer status and each of (1) the challenged legislative taxing and spending authority, and (2) the specific constitutional
infringement alleged. 0 5 The Court noted that a claimant could not challenge an incidental regulatory expenditure nor merely allege that an
enactment is generally beyond congressional powers.10 6 However, the
Court did not define or provide any further context for how proximate

99.
Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1455 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294, 307 (1962)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
100. Id at 1462.
101.
Id.
102. See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) ("The 'establishment of religion'
clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government
can ... pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.").
103. See Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447,487-88 (1923).
104. See Stern, supra note 3.
105. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968).
Id at 102-03.
106.
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the "logical link" or "nexus" must be, thus creating a slippery slope for
the Flast exception.o
Because the Flast exception is so vague, it can support sharply divergent opinions.'0 8 Whereas the majority in Winn found that the Arizona
taxpayers' purported injury under Flast's nexus test was merely "speculative,"' 09 the dissent suggested that its "simple restatement of the Flast
standard should be enough to establish that the [claimants] have standing."' 1 0 Evidence of such divergent opinions, in turn, raises concerns that
decisions on standing are wrongly influenced by the Court's instincts on
the merits or views related to judicial intervention rather than by the
claimants' eligibility to invoke jurisdiction."'
2. Flast's Exclusive Reliance on Madison's Memorialand Remonstrance Is Misguided
Second, the FlastCourt's exclusive reliance on Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance is misguided. In an effort to reconcile the Establishment Clause and general standing bar, the Flast Court deemed the
Establishment Clause a specific limitation to congressional taxing and
spending power.11 2 To arrive at this conclusion, the Flast Court relied
exclusively on James Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance Against
Religious Assessments." 3 Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance is "an
important document in the history of the Establishment Clause."" 4 indeed, the Court has cited it in more than thirty cases over the last sixtyfive years." 5 And its author, James Madison, is "generally recognized 6as
the leading architect of the religion clauses of the First Amendment."" l
However, Flast's exclusive reliance on Madison's Memorial and
Remonstrance is misguided because the Memorial and Remonstrance
(a) was a political, not a legal, argument;1 7 (b) appears to reflect Madi-

See id.
107.
See Rahdert, supra note 12, at 1015.
108.
109.
Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1447 (2011).
Id. at 1451 (Kagan, J., dissenting). For examples of similarly divergent views on the scope
110.
and meaning of the Flast exception, see the Court's plurality or majority opinions and dissents in
Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 593, 637 (2007), and Valley Forge
Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 470, 490
(1982).
See Rahdert, supra note 12, at 1015-16; id. at 1057 ("[Jludges who think intervention [is]
111.
necessary, because the government action in question may be unconstitutional, are more likely to be
generous about standing.").
See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 105-06 (1968).
112.
113. See Duncan, supra note 2, at 36 (noting that, other than Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance, the Flast Court cited no other piece of historical evidence for its creation of the taxpayer
standing exception).
114.
Borough of Duryea v. Guamieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2499 (2011).
115. See, e.g., id.; Everson v. Bd. ofEduc., 330 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1947).
116. Flast, 392 U.S. at 103.
117.
See Duncan, supranote 2, at 47.
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son's "free exercise," not "establishment," concerns;"' and (c) is not
binding authority for Flast.
a. The Memorial and Remonstrance Was a Political, Not Legal, Argument
First, Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance arose during a political debate about popular legislation,"l 9 on which courts cannot opine.120
The Memorial and Remonstrance originated in a Virginia congressional
debate in 1785 over a bill proposing a tax to support Christian teachers.12 ' In an impassioned plea, James Madison asserted that any such
assessment, even one amounting to "three pence only," would infringe
upon people's religious liberties by forcing conformity to a particular
religion.122 At the time, James Madison served as a Virginia legislator
and not as a constitutional advocate or First Amendment draftsman presenting a legal argument about judicial review or taxpayer standing.12 3 A
political argument in the Virginia state legislature about the proposed use
of tax dollars does not serve as a valid, legal basis for taxpayer standing
of all U.S. citizens under the Establishment Clause.12 4
b. Madison Appears to Have Been Making a "Free Exercise,"
Not an "Establishment," Claim
Second, James Madison did not appear to be making an "establishment" claim,12 5 which was the very basis of the Flast decision.126 Indeed,
the Establishment Clause did not even exist at the time of Madison's
Memorial and Remonstrance.127 Commentators have suggested that the
Virginia dispute focused primarily on whether the proposed assessment
violated the "free exercise" rights set forth in the 1776 Declaration and
not whether the tax constituted an "establishment" of religion.128 In his
Memorial and Remonstrance, James Madison advocated for those constituents concerned about the tax's potential interference with their religious activities.' 29 By relying on the Memorial and Remonstrance to
118.
Id. at 50.
119.
Id. at 47-48.
120. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962) ("The nonjusticiability of a political question
is primarily a function of the separation of powers.").
121.
Flast, 392 U.S. at 104 n.24.
122.
Id at 103-04 (quoting MADISON, supra note 7, at 186).
123.
Duncan, supranote 2, at 46; see also Flast, 392 U.S. at 103, 104 n.24.
124.
See Duncan, supra note 2, at 54.
125.
Id. at 50; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
126.
See Flast,392 U.S. at 105-06.
127. James Madison issued his Memorial and Remonstrance in 1785, but Congress did not
submit the Bill of Rights, including the First Amendment's Establishment Clause, to the states until
1789. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 108 n.2 (1970) (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 37 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
See Duncan, supra note 2, at 51 (citing THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS:
128.
CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 146, 148 (1986)).

129.
"The Religion ... of every man must be left to the conviction and conscience of every
man; and it is the right of every man to exercise it as these may dictate." MADISON, supra note 7, at
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support taxpayer standing under the Establishment Clause, 30 Flast may
have improperly conflated "free exercise" with "establishment" of religion.'31
c. The Memorial and Remonstrance Is Not Binding Authority
for Flast
Third, the Memorial and Remonstrance does not serve as binding
authority for Flast.13 2 Because of its origins outside the Framers' debates
regarding the Establishment Clause, the Memorial and Remonstrance is
not authoritative like typical legislative history, let alone binding on the
Court. At best, the Memorial and Remonstrance has some persuasive
authority given that (1) the facts of the underlying dispute were analogous to those in Flast,and (2) its author played a leading role in the subsequent creation of the Establishment Clause.
Viewed in its proper context, Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance fails to support on its own an exception to the general bar against
taxpayer standing.'3 3 In his dissent in Flast, Justice Harlan criticized the
Court's reliance on "isolated dicta" from Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance,'34 eerily foreshadowing the problems that Flast would pose
for courts in general and the Winn Court in particular.
B. Winn's Tax CreditDistinctionfor Standing Under the Establishment
Clause
Not only does Winn highlight the potential problems posed by Flast,
but it also distinguishes between a tax credit and a government expenditure for purposes of evaluating taxpayer standing under the Establishment Clause.13 5 The following analysis will seek to demonstrate that
(1) the tax credit distinction, though new to standing, does not violate
precedent; (2) the utility of the tax credit distinction depends on the context; and (3) the tax credit distinction has merit in the context of Winn.

184. "Above all are [men] to be considered as retaining an 'equal title to the free exercise of Religion according to the dictates of conscience."' Id. at 186 (quoting THE VA. DECLARATION OF
RIGHTS art. XVI (1776)). "Because, finally, 'the equal right of every citizen to the free exercise of
his Religion according to the dictates of conscience' is held by the same tenure with all our other
rights." Id at 190. See also Duncan, supra note 2, at 52.
130.
See Flasi, 392 U.S. at 1034)4.
See Duncan, supra note 2, at 52. But see Everson, 330 U.S. at 40 (Rutledge, J., dissenting)
131.
(noting that, for Madison, "'[e]stablishment' and 'free exercise' were correlative and coextensive
ideas, representing only different facets of the single great and fundamental freedom").
132.
See Flast, 392 U.S. at 126, 126 n.15 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
133.
See Duncan, supra note 2, at 53.
134.
See Flast, 392 U.S. at 126 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
135.
See Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1449 (2011).
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1. The Tax Credit Distinction Is New to Standing Doctrine, but
Does Not Violate Precedent
Although novel to standing doctrine, the Court's distinction between a tax credit and a government expenditure does not violate
precedent. In Winn, the Court relied on the tax credit distinction in deciding that the claimants lacked standing.136 In her dissent, Justice Kagan
aptly pointed out that the Court had never before relied on this distinction
to dismiss a claim for lack of standing.13 7 Justice Kagan suggested that a
tax credit is merely a state subsidy in another name.13 8 Either way, according to Justice Kagan, the Arizona government financed sectarian
STOs and scholarships, thereby allowing taxpayers to challenge the subsidy. 3 9 The dissent further suggested that the majority's "extraction"
requirement was new, disingenuous, or lacked precedential support.14 0
However, the Court previously cited Flast's extraction requirement in
DaimlerChryslerv. Cuno.141 In Cuno, the Court noted that the Flast
Court "understood the 'injury' alleged in Establishment Clause challenges to federal spending to be the very 'extract[ion] and spen[ding]' of
'tax money' in aid of religion alleged by a plaintiff." 4 2
In addition, the dissent pointed out that the Court had previously
reached a decision on the merits of Establishment Clause cases involving
tax credits without questioning the claimants' standing.14 3 However, as
the majority noted, those cases did not mention standing and thus did not
stand for the proposition that no jurisdictional defect existed.'" Without
mentioning or otherwise ruling on standing, those cases do not serve as
binding precedent for purposes of taxpayer standing or judicial review.145
Courts would indeed risk grave error if they relied on or assumed unstated rules of law from prior cases.146 Any such judicial practice would

136. Id. at 1447.
137. Id. at 1452 (Kagan, J., dissenting). The Court made a similar albeit less fine distinction
between a grant of real property and government expenditure in Valley Forge Christian Coll. v.
Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 480 (1982), which also faced
criticism by its dissenting Justices. Id. at 511-12 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.,
dissenting).
138. See Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1450 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
139. Id.
140. See id. at 1459 (suggesting that that the majority "plucks the three words 'extrac[t] and
spen[d]' from ... the Flast opinion," whose two-part nexus test contains no such extraction requirement, to "severely constrict" the scope of the decision).
141.
547 U.S. 332, 348 (2006).
142. Id (alterations in original) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968)).
143.
Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1452-53 (Kagan, J., dissenting); see also Bowen v. Kendrick, 487
U.S. 589, 619 (1988) (finding standing partly because, in similar cases, the Court had "not questioned the standing of taxpayer plaintiffs to raise Establishment Clause challenges").
144.
Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1448 (majority opinion).
145. See id.
146. See id. at 1449; Harper v. Va. Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 119 (1993) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
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greatly undermine stare decisis. 147 Furthermore, just as every other court
"has an independent obligation to consider standing,"1 4 8 so does the
Court in Winn. All courts, including the United States Supreme Court,
retain the authority to grant or deny standing sua sponte, even if the parties or lower courts do not raise the issue. 149 In Winn, the Court duly exercised its authority to deny standing. 5 0
2. The Utility of the Tax Credit Distinction Depends on the Context
The utility of the distinction between a tax credit and a government
expenditure depends on the context. In her dissent, Justice Kagan acknowledged that the distinction is not useful in every context because
"the distinction is one in search of a difference" in "many contexts."1si In
suggesting the purportedly artificial distinction in Winn, the dissent emphasized that federal and state government budgeting rules routinely
insist on cost calculations relating to tax credits as well as tax expenditures. 152 In a budgeting context, departments of revenue, of course, want
to understand the financial impact of both tax credits and expenditures on
their bottom lines.' 53 However, state budgeting practices are not dispositive of whether a tax credit distinction has merit in Establishment Clause

cases. 154
The dissent also indicated that Arizona STOs, in their solicitation
efforts, acknowledge that donor contributions come from other taxpayers.'55 In a sales and marketing context, STOs, of course, will couch the
tax credit in a way that is self-serving and most likely to maximize contributions.156 However, advertising and sales practices are not dispositive
of whether a tax credit distinction has merit in Establishment Clause cas-

es. 157
The dissent further noted that the Court itself in Cuno suggested that
injuries resulting from a tax subsidy and cash grant are equivalent.' 58
See Harper, 509 U.S. at 120 ("Any rule that creates a grave risk that [the Court] might
147.
resolve important issues of national concern sub silentio, without thought or consideration, cannot be
a wise one.").
Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1454 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
148.
149.
See id.
150.
See id. at 1449 (majority opinion).
151.
Id. at 1455 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
152. See id at 1456.
See id.
153.
154. Cf Duncan, supra note 2, at 54 (noting that an unmistakably political argument about the
proposed use of tax dollars does not serve as a legal basis for taxpayer standing).
155.
Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1458 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (noting that STOs, to elicit support,
"highlight that 'donations' are made not with an individual's own, but with other people's-i.e.,
taxpayers'-money").
156.
Cf Duncan, supra note 2, at 56 ("Madison's views were protean, depending on whether
he was occupying the role of Virginia legislator, constitutional advocate, First Amendment
draftsman, President, or former President.").
157.
Cf supra note 154.
Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1457 (Kagan, J., dissenting) ("In either case . . . the alleged injury is
158.
based on the asserted effect of the allegedly illegal activity on public revenues, to which the taxpayer
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However, the lack of utility of the tax credit distinction in a Commerce
Clause case is not indicative of its merit in an Establishment Clause
case.'" 9 These examples merely demonstrate that the tax credit distinction
may not have merit in every context.
In her dissent, Justice Kagan also presented examples of overt state
funding of religion to highlight the purported invalidity of the tax credit
distinction.160 For example, Justice Kagan presented a hypothetical scenario in which a state seeks to reward members of different religious
sects $500 per year for their religious devotion.ist The dissent then
asked, should taxpayer standing of nonadherents depend on whether targeted recipients receive an annual stipend or claim the $500 in aid on
their annual tax returns? 62 Of course not, but this scenario does not
present the facts of Winn. Whereas Justice Kagan's hypothetical scenario
presents overt government favoritism for specific religious groups identified by the state, the charitable contributions in Winn "result from the
decisions of private taxpayers regarding their own funds." 63 In any case,
purported victims of overt discrimination could likely "advance[] arguments for jurisdiction independent of Flast"'" by demonstrating a direct,
65
or Lujan.'66 This hypothetical situconcrete injury under Frothingham1
ation merely highlights that the tax credit distinction is not useful in the
context of overt religious discrimination, thereby begging the question if
the distinction has merit in cases like Winn.
3. The Tax Credit Distinction Has Merit in Winn
The Court's distinction between a tax credit and a government expenditure has merit in Winn. The strength of the rule against taxpayer
standing relative to Flast's exception arguably informed the Court's tax
credit distinction. The Court has understood the rule against taxpayer
standing as a general or default prohibition.16 7 Conversely, the Court has
contributes." (quoting DaimlerChrysler v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 344 (2006)) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
159.
Cf Cuno, 547 U.S. at 349 (ruling that Ohio state and Toledo city taxpayers do not have
standing on grounds that the Establishment Clause challenge in Flast is somehow like their Commerce Clause challenge to tax credits inducing an automobile manufacturer to remain in Toledo).
160. See Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1457 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (citing Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 25 (1989), in which the Court found that a Texas sales tax exemption for religious
publications violated the Establishment Clause).
161.
Id
162.
Id.
Id at 1448 (majority opinion) ("Private citizens create private STOs; STOs choose bene163.
ficiary schools; and taxpayers then contribute to STOs.").
164.
Id at 1449.
165. See supra text accompanying note 21.
166. See supra text accompanying note 73.
Cf Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1445 ("Flast's holding provides a 'narrow exception' to 'the gen167.
eral rule against taxpayer standing."' (quoting Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 618 (1988))); Hein
v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 593 (2007) (plurality opinion) ("In Flast v.
Cohen, we recognized a narrow exception to the general rule against federal taxpayer standing."
(citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 88 (1968))); DaimlerChrysler v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 348 (2006)
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viewed Flast as a "narrow exception" to the rule. The relatively narrow scope of Flast's exception likely sowed the seeds of the tax credit

distinction.169
The tax credit distinction might not be useful to a state comptroller
preparing budget scenarios, to a nonprofit fundraiser seeking to maximize charitable contributions, or to a court hearing a case involving a facially discriminatory tax credit, but the distinction has real meaning in
interpreting Flast's "narrow exception" to the rule against taxpayer
standing. The distinction between a tax credit and a government expenditure in Winn has merit because it (a) is rooted in the text of Flast;
(b) avoids speculative decisions; and (c) preserves judicial economy.
a. The Tax Credit Distinction Is Rooted in the Text of Flast
First, the tax credit distinction derives from the very text of Flast,
which requires a taxpayer to challenge not just taxing authority-but
70
congressional taxing and spending power-to be eligible for standing.1
Flast'sfirst prong requires that a taxpayer challenge an exercise of "congressional power under the taxing and spending clause."171 In an apparent subrule, the Court elaborated on the meaning of spending, noting the
type of regulatory expenditures that would not invoke the rule.172 in
Flast, the Court mentioned "taxing and spending" authority on eleven
occasions, 173 including once in the Court's statement of the holding.17 4 in
the sentence following the holding, the Court provided further context to
the meaning of "taxing and spending" power by using the "extract[ion]
and spen[ding]"s 75 analogy, on which the Court had indeed relied prior to
Winn. 176 The Flast Court used an "or" construction in discussing these
distinct congressional powers on just one occasion, when it referred to
the government's failed assertion that no standing be conferred to challenge a "taxing or spending" program.
("[A] broad application of Flast's exception to the general prohibition on taxpayer standing would
be quite at odds with its narrow application in ... precedent. . . ."(citing Flast, 392 U.S. at 106)).
168.
See supra note 167.
169.
Cf Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1445 ("It must be noted at the outset that ... Flast's holding provides a 'narrow exception' to 'the general rule against taxpayer standing."' (emphasis added) (quoting Bowen, 487 U.S. at 618)).
170. See Flast,392 U.S. at 102.
171.
Id.
172. See id. ("It will not be sufficient to allege an incidental expenditure of tax funds in the
administration of an essentially regulatory statute.").
See id. at passim (emphasis added).
173.
See id at 105-06 ("Consequently, we hold that a taxpayer will have standing consistent
174.
with Article III to invoke federal judicial power when he alleges that congressional action under the
taxing and spending clause is in derogation of those constitutional provisions which operate to
restrict the exercise of the taxing and spending power." (emphasis added)).
175.
See id at 106 ("The taxpayer's allegation in such cases would be that his [or her] tax
money is being extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional protections against such
abuses of legislative power.").
176.
See DaimlerChrysler v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 348 (2006).
Flast, 392 U.S. at 98 (emphasis added).
177.
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If the Flast Court intended the exception to apply to exercises of
mere taxing and not spending authority, it would have said so. The Arizona taxpayers' interpretation of a tax credit suggests that a contribution
yielding tax credits is "owed to the State" and "should be treated as if it
were government property."' However, that interpretation renders
Flast's spending language superfluous or defines a tax credit in a way
that has "no basis in standing jurisprudence." 79 Because a tax credit invokes taxing and not spending power, it does not fall within the Flast
exception.
b. The Tax Credit Distinction Avoids Speculative Decisions
Second, the tax credit distinction avoids speculative decisions.
Whereas an affirmative tax on targeted constituents may make the alleged economic or psychic harm discernible, a tax credit requires courts
to speculate about the potential impact of such tax credit on future tax
bills.180 To find specific injury, courts must assume that legislators will
increase plaintiffs' tax bills to offset the supposed deficit caused by the
tax credit.' To find requisite redressability, courts must speculate that,
if injunctive relief were provided, elected officials would pass along the
purported increased revenue by way of reduced taxes for taxpayerplaintiffs. 182
Conjecture regarding improperly vetted claims leads to bad decisions.183 Decisions of the United States Supreme Court have wide implications that are not easily undone because they establish binding, federalquestion precedent for lower courts.1 84 By establishing the tax credit distinction and denying standing in Winn, the Court properly avoids issuing
what otherwise might be considered an advisory opinion in a matter that
lacks specific injury.185 Instead, the Court seeks to develop concrete and
consistent Establishment Clause jurisprudence for the benefit of federal
and state courts, government officials, and taxpayer-citizens., 86

178.
Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1448 (2011). But see id. at 1458 (Kagan, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe
STO tax payment is . . . 'costless' to the individual; it comes out of what [the taxpayer] otherwise
would be legally obligated to pay the State-hence, out of public resources." (quoting Winn IV, 542

U.S. 88, 95 (2004))).
179. See id at l448.
180. See id at 1444, 1447.
181.
Id. at 1444.
182. Id
183.
See id at 1449 ("The Court would risk error if it relied on assumptions that have gone
unstated and unexamined.").
184. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 353-55 (1816).
185. Cf Alabama v. Arizona, 291 U.S. 286, 291-92 (1934) ("This court may not be called on
to give advisory opinions or to pronounce declaratory judgments.... Leave will not be granted
unless the threatened injury is clearly shown to be of serious magnitude and imminent.").
186. See Mahnich v. S. S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96, 113 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting) (noting how
inconsistency in the Court's decisions can "leave the courts below on an uncharted sea of doubt and
difficulty without any confidence that what was said yesterday will hold good tomorrow").
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c. The Tax Credit Distinction Preserves Judicial Economy
Third, the distinction between a tax credit and a government expenditure preserves judicial economy. Whereas the Winn Court suggested that it merely declined to extend Flast,'87 the dissent insisted that
the Court's decision "devastates taxpayer standing in Establishment
Clause cases."' Obviously, both perspectives have conflicting views as
to whether a challenge to a tax credit is properly within the Flast exception. Because the Court had never ruled on this issue before Winn, the
magnitude of the decision's impact on potential claimants and lower
courts is difficult to measure. Regardless of one's view on the merits of
that tradeoff, the Court's denial of standing in Winn frees the Judiciary
from having to hear similar cases in the future. This preservation of judicial economy provided an underlying policy justification for the Court's
decision.189 A universal rule to provide standing for all claims challenging a tax credit could have resulted in an expansion of Establishment
Clause plaintiffs.190 A broad application of Flast arguably would have
been "at odds with .. . Flast's own promise that it would not transform
91
federal courts into forums for taxpayers' 'generalized grievances.""
The Court's decision in Winn indeed averts that outcome.19 2
C. Comparisonof the Tax CreditDistinctionin Winn to the Subsidy Exception Under the Dormant Commerce Clause
Although a tax credit and a subsidy are similar in some ways,' the
juxtaposition of Winn's tax credit distinction under the Establishment
Clause and the subsidy exception under the dormant Commerce Clause
arguably reveals further reasoning for the Court's decision in Winn.'94
Taxpayer standing under the Establishment and dormant Commerce
Clauses are similar in several respects. Under each legal doctrine, a private litigant is seeking to invoke the power of the federal Judiciary to
challenge legislative or executive authority.19 5 Each legal doctrine in187.
See Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1449 (noting that a contrary holding would "alter the rules of
standing").
188.
Id at 1462 (Kagan, I., dissenting).
189.
See id. at 1449 (majority opinion) ("In an era of frequent litigation [and] class actions, . ..
courts must be more careful to insist on the formal rules of standing, not less so.").
190.
See id.
191.
DaimlerChrysler v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 348 (2006) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83,
106 (1968)).
192.
Cf United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring) (noting
that "[r]elaxation of standing requirements is directly related to the expansion ofjudicial power").
193.
Cf Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1456 (Kagan, J., dissenting) ("[T]ax breaks are often 'economically and functionally indistinguishable from a direct monetary subsidy."' (quoting Rosenberger v.
Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 859 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring))).
194.
See Elliott, supra note 10, at 189 (reviewing various means Congress might employ to
expand standing under the Commerce Clause, from which the dormant Commerce Clause emanates).
195.
Cf Rahdert, supra note 12, at 1063 n.255 (noting various ways in which litigants might
challenge displays of commerce and spending authority in the context of the dispute resolution aims
of Frothingham).
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volves a federal or state government actor and a purportedly discriminatory tax.196 Under each legal doctrine, a claimant asserts breach of a con97
stitutional provision: the Establishment Clause or Commerce Clause.1
Under each legal doctrine, the enactment at issue displays varying levels
of religious-based' 9 8 or commerce-based discriminatory bias.' 99 Under
each legal doctrine, a court determines if the government actor exceeded
its establishment or commerce powers.200
As provided by the Winn Court, a taxpayer lacks standing under
Flast to challenge a tax credit but not a government expenditure. 20 1 By
comparison, a claimant may establish standing under the dormant Commerce Clause to challenge a state tax discriminating against out-of-state
parties202 but not a similarly discriminatory state subsidy from general
tax funds.203 Unlike the newly shielded status in Winn of a tax credit under the Establishment Clause, 20 the analogous discriminatory tax exemption or rebate receives no such favorable treatment under the dormant
Commerce Clause.205 Bedause the dormant Commerce Clause generally
aims to prevent the discriminatory tax policy at issue-which goes to the
heart of interstate commerce-the Court might be more generous about
taxpayer standing in that context and thus unwilling to adopt the tax credit distinction. Purported violations of the Establishment Clause,

196. See Cuno, 547 U.S. at 348 (dictum) ("[T]he [Establishment and Commerce] Clauses are
similar in that they often implicate governments' fiscal decisions . . . .").
197. See id at 345-46 (noting that a claim by city and state taxpayers alleging that DaimlerChrysler's tax credit imposed a disproportionate tax burden on them under the Commerce Clause "is
no different from similar claims by federal taxpayers" already rejected by the Court as insufficient to
establish standing under the Establishment Clause).
See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 593 (1988) (holding that the Adolescent Family
198.
Life Act did not violate the Establishment Clause "on its face," but remanding for determination of
whether the Act violated the Establishment Clause "as applied").
199. In a dormant Commerce Clause case, an enactment might be per se invalid, discriminatory
on its face, discriminatory in purpose, discriminatory in effect, merely burdensome on interstate
commerce, or within the ordinary police power of the state. See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of
Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 392-94 (1994).
200. See supranote 194.
201.
See Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1447 (2011).
202. See, e.g., Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 336-37 (1992) (invalidating an
Alabama law imposing a waste disposal fee on hazardous waste generated outside Alabama and
disposed of in Alabama but not on hazardous waste generated and disposed of in Alabama).
See, e.g., W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 199 (1994) (dictum) ("A pure
203.
subsidy funded out of general revenue ordinarily imposes no burden on interstate commerce. . . .");
New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988) (dictum) ("Direct subsidization of
domestic industry does not ordinarily run afoul of [the dormant Commerce Clause] .....
204. See Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1447.
205. See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 568, 595
(1997) (invalidating a Maine state statute that provided a property tax exemption to charitable institutions in Maine but denied full exemption to institutions conducted or operated principally for the
benefit of persons who were not Maine residents); W. Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 188 (invalidating
a Massachusetts state law that imposed an assessment on all sales of milk to Massachusetts retailers
but rebated all proceeds from this assessment to Massachusetts dairy farmers).
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however, can take many forms beyond just discriminatory tax policy.206
Therefore, the Court might find that plaintiffs challenging a tax credit
under the Establishment Clause do not require as much latitude to bring a
claim as those challenging a tax credit under the dormant Commerce
Clause.
CONCLUSION

Approximately forty-four years ago in Flast, the Supreme Court
created, for Establishment Clause claims, a "dramatic" exception to the
general rule against taxpayer standing.207 Since then, the Court has wrestled with the precise meaning and scope of Flast,20 8 whose exception is
unduly vague and exclusively relied on James Madison's Memorial and
Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments. Flast's reliance on Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance, however, is misguided because it
was a political, not a legal, argument; appears to reflect Madison's "free
exercise," not "establishment," concerns; and is not binding authority for
Flast.
In Winn, the Court reconsidered the Flast exception and relied on a
distinction between a tax credit and a government expenditure in dismissing an Establishment Clause claim for the plaintiffs' lack of standing.209 Although "novel" in the context of standing doctrine,21o Winn's
tax credit distinction has merit because it derives from the text of Flast,
avoids speculative decisions, and preserves judicial economy. 2 11 Furthermore, the tax credit distinction does not unduly restrict taxpayer
standing in Establishment Clause cases because purported violations of
the Establishment Clause-unlike those of the dormant Commerce
Clause-can take many forms beyond just discriminatory tax policy.
As did Hein, Winn highlighted the division between the Court's
conservative and liberal blocs, which denied and unsuccessfully supported standing, respectively. 2 12 Critics of Article III standing doctrine
maintain that the Court's strict version of standing emerged in reaction to
public interest litigation in the late 1970s.2' In this current "era of fre-

Cf Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1449 (noting that standing in Establishment Clause cases can be
206.
shown in various ways).
207. Duncan, supra note 2.
208. See Stem, supra note 3.
209. See Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1447.
210. See id. at 1450 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
See id at 1449 (majority opinion); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968).
211.
212. See Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1439; Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587,
591 (2007). The conservative bloc is further split between the Justices who seek to eliminate taxpayer standing altogether and those who prefer an incremental approach. See Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 144950; Hein, 551 U.S. at 615, 618; Rahdert, supra note 12, at 1046.
213. See Elliott, supranote 10, at 169.
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quent litigation,",214 the Court's strict version of taxpayer standing under
the Establishment Clause appears to be alive and well.
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Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1449.
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